The present research investigates the psychological nature of the effects of chlorpromazine on chronic schizophrenics. Numerous reports indicate that this drug has appreciable effects on the behavioral status of patients. It reduces motor excitement, agitation, noisiness, and aggression. Treated patients show more interest in self-care and become more reliable in handling privileges, work assignments, and money. Unfortunately, however, these findings have been based almost exclusively upon psychiatric observations and subjective clinical impressions as to the changes in overt symptoms. The effect of the drug on intrinsic psychotic mechanisms, such as the presence of uncontrolled primary-process thinking, 2 has not been studied intensively in psychoanalytic theory. Uncontrolled, primary-process thinking is the factor most constantly associated with extreme ego weakness (Bellak, 1958; Rapaport, 1951; Schafer, 1958) . Accordingly, it was used here as the measure of basic change.
Only a minority of the numerous clinical studies on chlorpromazine have employed standardized psychological tests to assess drug effects. Some of the most powerful of the projective methods have played only a mariThis paper is based upon the author's doctoral dissertation in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the doctorate degree, New York University. It was read in summarized form at the American Psychological Association, New York, September 1961.
2 This term is explained and discussed below in Theoretical Considerations section.
ginal role, if any, in these studies. Consequently, we know very little about how chlorpromazine affects such psychological functions as primary-and secondary-process thinking. Because changes in the relative weights of these two types of thinking, as influenced by chlorpromazine, are the major interest here, this study emphasized the Rorschach, scored following Holt's (1959) method as described below.
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
In 1900 Freud (1938) early distinguished between a "primary process," wherein the instinctual drives manifest themselves without control or delay, and a "secondary process," wherein drives are ordered and controlled by rational thought and voluntary action.
Despite considerable theoretical controversy, there is general agreement (Brenner, 1955; Hartmann, 1950; Holt, 1956; Schafer, 1958) that the primary process is genetically and formally the more primitive, operating with unneutralized, mobile drive energies, and regulated by the pleasure principle. It constitutes striving toward immediate gratification without regard for reality or logic and through the mechanisms of displacement, condensation, substitute formation, and symbolization. The secondary process operates in accordance with the reality principle; it is oriented toward the sought-for object in reality, using delays of impulse, detours, and experimental action in logical thought, until 247 the suitable object and modes of action have been found. Obviously, the distinctions mentioned represent ideal polar positions; any specific behavior must be assessed in terms of its relative position with respect to a logical continuum or the particular admixture of primary and secondary process. There are all degrees of transition, reflected by shifting levels of psychic functioning.
Though primary and secondary process were first denned in connection with dream interpretations, they are also good working concepts for the study of schizophrenic ideation (cf. Rapaport, 1951) . The formal, descriptive characteristics of the primary process bear a striking resemblance to the formal characteristics of schizophrenic thinking.
For purposes of the present study, primary process is inferred from (and denned by) communicated thought exhibiting any one of the following characteristics: (a) Inappropriate or unadaptive intrusion of libidinal or aggressive contents; (b) Condensation, symbolization, fragmentations, loose or fluid association, syncretic or autistic logic, logical contradictions, and impaired reality testing. The secondary process is similarly inferred from and denned by thinking that is faithful to logic and to external reality, that is purposive and organized for efficient goal-directed activity, and showing only appropriate drive-elements. It is not rare in clinical testing to turn up evidences of primary process in the records of only moderately neurotic patients. What distinguishes these individuals from institutionalized psychotics is the greater success of their regulative strategies in handling the primary-process encroachment. One person, for example, might casually see a "threatening" figure on Card IV of the Rorschach, and point out with some amusement the incongruity of the large feet and the small arms. A person of this type might characteristically deal with primary process by permitting it into awareness in an ego-syntonic, modulated, and controlled fashion without experiencing emotional havoc. The less healthy person might see the same figure, find it "horrible" and quickly give up the card. For example, certain psychotic patients perceive their primary-process manifestations as ego-alien, unpleasant, and highly disruptive foreign intrusions upon the ego.
Thus, it is necessary not only to measure the relative predominance of primary-and secondary-process thinking, but also to determine the extent to which a person is master of, or is mastered by, primary-process elements in his thinking. The method of choice, then, must not only facilitate the emergence of identifiable primary-process material, but also provide for evaluating or scoring the responses. Recently, Holt and his co-workers (Holt, 1956; Holt & Havel, 1960) have systematized the application of the psychoanalytic theory of thinking to evaluation of Rorschach performance. Holt's (1959) manual provides a way of gauging both the amount of primary process that appears in Rorschach protocols and the effectiveness with which these manifestations are controlled. This procedure operationally defines the Rorschach variables used in the present study.
PROCEDURE
The subjects (5s) for this study consisted of 40 patients newly admitted to two Veterans Administration hospitals.
8 They were all males with a basic diagnosis of schizophrenic reaction. None had reached his SSth birthday by the date of entry into the study, there was no history of central nervous system disease, and none of them had had lobotomies. The patients were randomly assigned to one of two groups. The experimental group received chlorpromazine; the control group received a placebo, lactose. These drugs were packaged in individual bottles with only the patient's name printed on them as a means of identification. Instructions for administration were the same for each patient. Throughout the experiment, whether the patient received the drug or a placebo was not known to anyone connected with the experiment. The daily dose for each of the drugs was four 100-milligram pills. The two kinds of pills were identical in size, shape, color, and taste. Medication was provided for each patient entered into the study for a 3-month period.
In order to find out whether the medications used had any effect on the patients in this study, research data were obtained from two sources: (1) pre-and postdrug Rorschach protocols, and (2) pre-and postdrug evaluations on the Multidimensional Scale for Rating Psychiatric Patients (Lorr, 19S3) . 3 The author was especially fortunate in gathering his data at two hospitals (Togus and Manhattan) where a maximum of harmony and consideration exist. His colleagues in nursing, social work, psychology, and psychiatry have in no small measure contributed much of whatever substance this paper may possess.
1. Rorschach data: The relevance and utility of the Rorschach test in assessing primary-process thought manifestations have been described by Holt and Havel (1960) in a progress report on the use of the method which Holt devised for scoring primary-process thinking as manifested in Rorschach performance.
All Rorschachs were administered by the author. The resulting 80 protocols were scored by doctoral students in clinical psychology who had no knowledge of any patient's drug or diagnostic status. Fifty-three records were scored independently by two persons who then met to adjust their differences and arrive at a consensus. Because of the time-consuming nature of the scoring procedure, 27 records were done by a single scorer. The following summary measures were derived:
(a) Sum Level 1 of primary process: The Rorschach manual distinguishes between material that is more direct, intense, raw, or blatant (scored "Level 1"), and relatively more civilized or socialized manifestations of the primary process (scored "Level 2"). Since the present study used a schizophrenic population, the Level 1 summary score helps to measure the extent to which the pressure of driveideation has overridden realistic and logical considerations. Sum Level 1 of primary process consists of the total number of responses having scorable Level 1 primary-process manifestations. Responses having one or more full primary-process instances were tallied as one, and responses having only weak scores were tallied as one-half. The uncorrected rater reliability for this score was .90.
(b) Mean Defense Demand: Holt (1959) defines defense demand as the degree to which the very nature of the underlying idea, or (in the case of the formal variables) the way it emerges, demands that some defensive and controlling measures be undertaken in order to make it a more socially acceptable communication [pp. 41-42] .
Every response given a primary-process score was rated on a 6-point scale for its defense demand, that is, for the inherent or implicit "outrageousness" built into the content of the response or the way it emerged. This rating represents a finer differentiation of the Level 1-Level 2 dichotomy. Responses rated at the upper extreme, that is, 4, 5, or 6, were those with the greatest need for defense. The mean defense demand consists of the sum of the ratings for defense demand divided by the total number of responses that were given a primary-process score. The uncorrected rater reliability for this score was .74.
(c) Mean Defense Effectiveness: Every response given a primary-process score was rated on a 6-point scale for its degree of success in coping with the defense demand of the response, with 1 the most effective and 6 the most ineffective, control of the primary process. Mean defense effectiveness is the sum of the ratings for defense effectiveness divided by the total number of responses having a primary-process score. For the present study, because of the above concentration on the more extreme, (a) The interview observations were made by teams consisting of a clinical psychologist and a psychiatrist. The teams were responsible for all later interviewing and rating. The important consideration was that the same team should rate the same patients during the entire period of the study to insure the greatest reliability feasible.
(b) The ward observation was conducted by a ward nurse who cared for the patient. The ward nurse was provided with copies of the scale, and familiarized herself with its contents. Two days prior to a rating, the ward nurse was notified in order that she might have ample opportunity to observe the patients' behavior in the areas to be rated. Only one ward nurse was used for observations on any given ward.
RESULTS
The results of the study first of all provide additional weight for the published reports that chlorpromazine is helpful in altering the symptoms and behavior of schizophrenic patients (Table 1 ). The Lorr Morbidity scores leave little doubt that patients who took the drug showed a greater reduction in anxiety, agitation, and emotional lability than the amount occurring from placebo alone.
In Tables 2 and 3 , these behavioral changes are confirmed by the Rorschach findings, particularly the appreciable improvement in the defense effectiveness. The experimental data suggest that while, for the most part, psychotic thinking as measured by the total amount of blatant, defense-demanding primary process was unaffected by chlorpromazine, there was a pronounced favorable shift in the patient's attitude toward the heretofore disturbing ideation and his manner of handling it. In other words, test-retest comparison of the drug-versus-placebo Rorschach protocols shows that chlorpromazine had no reliable tendency to remove signs of psychosis in the formal or content aspects of primaryprocess thinking. Rather, the major effect of the drug seems to be a qualitative one. Intrinsic psychotic phenomena (e.g., autistic logic, arbitrary combinations, logical contradictions) were not abolished but there was a definite modification of their emotional consequences. When symptoms that make the patient feel the need to be defensive and afraid of his own impulses are controlled by a drug, there is a striking effect on communication and socialization. It may be that the patient slowly tests himself out in his environment, and when he is successful, feels himself to be a more adequate person. Table 4 shows that within the treated group, amounts of independently rated clinical improvement were highly correlated with the degree of improvement in mean defense effectiveness, that is, the effectiveness with which the patient coped with the more extreme (Level 1) manifestations of primary process in his Rorschach responses. It is striking that the same level of relationship held true in the placebo group: patients "spontaneously improved" by clinical criteria did so by the test criterion of defense effectiveness also. It is interesting that the low positive correlation between Lorr scale improvement and changes in the other Rorschach measures attained some statistical significances when the two samples were combined. There was, therefore, a slight but reliable tendency for patients whose ward behavior improved, for whatever reason, to express less extreme primary-process material in their second Rorschachs. Finally, the fact that the correlations between behavioral change and Rorschach changes were quite similar for both the drug and placebo groups would seem in full accord with the view that chlorpromazine helps facilitate "spontaneous remission."
An analysis of the postdrug Rorschach records sheds some light on the precise nature of the changes that have taken place.
1. The first line of figures in Table 5 shows that there is a significant shift in the form accuracy and organization of the responses. The higher level of reality testing is reflected in the more logical, objective, and critical attitude that the patient maintains. Unconvincing blot interpretations tend to become articulated and elaborated upon until they are less conspicuously weak. Vague form responses diminish.
2. According to the second line in Table 5 , chlorpromazine also seems to have a farreaching effect on a person's total defensive operations. The remainder of the table breaks this finding down further:
(a) Whereas verbalization on the original Rorschach reflected an uncritical acceptance of primary-process material, the second time around patients frequently relinquished or replaced their responses ("Two men having a bloody fight-no! It looks now like they are dancing!"), and on occasion, modified their percepts ("A bat with two heads or maybe this end is the head and the bottom is the tail"). These are examples of positive changes in sequence (see Table 5 , line 3).
(b) There was an appreciable increase in the effectiveness with which drug patients used context in controlling primary-process material (see line 4). This fact bespeaks an improved ability to justify the deviant elements in a response so as to make it less estranged from group thinking. They made themes that would otherwise be quite shocking more appropriate by relating them to a custom, a cultural institution, or some other plausible context-aesthetic, intellectual, or humorous. The chlorpromazine patients in the current study seemed especially adept at selecting movies, television shows, and newspaper articles which safely accommodated their personal expressions of primary process ("This is a monster with big black hands and wings.
It goes after people and sucks their blood. It was once a man, but now it came back to life as a monster. The reason I say that is because I saw a Bela Lugosi picture in the auditorium last week, where they had a monster that looked nearly the same way").
3. The part of the defense effectiveness variable that seemed to be most profoundly affected by chlorpromazine was the material elicited on the affect inquiry. 4 Unfortunately, the affects were not quantified or subjected to a statistical analysis. Consequently, the author's account should be taken as subjective and impressionistic. Nevertheless, after taking chlorpromazine, many patients definitely seemed less inclined to link concepts with personal experiences, and when they did, the experiences were more often benign. There were fewer expressions of inadequacy, dis- satisfaction, and perplexity. More percepts were called "pleasant."' Emotional lability was at a minimum. The most frequent reaction to inquiry about feelings was a shrug of the shoulder, as if to say, "It's only a blot on the card. It's not real." DISCUSSION There seems to be considerable merit to the view that the effects of chlorpromazine upon openly hostile, anxious, and resistive patients initiate some degree of modification of the schizophrenic orientation. At the very least, the affective blunting that seems to take place makes most patients more amenable to institutional management. More important though, is the possibility that the diminution of anxiety permits a certain number of patients to integrate enough of the surrounding atmosphere to realize what is acceptable behavior and to selectively withhold their pathological symptoms. The temporary relief may serve as a beginning from which the patient may attain further improvement if given the opportunity to participate in various rehabilitative programs. It might be argued that any positive changes can be wholly accounted for by the lack of emotional involvement and that what might make for good hospital adjustment would not necessarily be conducive to adequate social functioning. While this may be a suitable explanation for the results obtained with some of the drug patients, it seems like a gross oversimplification for many others. Those individuals who improved upon their form accuracy, conceptual organization, and critical judgment were doing more than just being emotionally detached. Putting it in terms of primary and secondary process, the changes that were found when the various components of defense effectiveness were examined indicate an increase in the efficiency of secondary process working over of primaryprocess material. Of course, these results must be interpreted in terms of a decrease, but by no means a disappearance, of the predrug signs. Patients show varying degrees of change. Presumably, if a patient continued to maintain his gain and were retested some time later, we might sometimes find that there was an actual recession of the primary process. As yet, the literature contains no adequate follow-up studies regarding what takes place after drug treatment is discontinued.
Both the Lorr scale and the Rorschach manual proved their worth in the present study. The Lorr scale has enjoyed a wide reputation for being able to pick up behavioral improvement in patients. Its discriminatory power in illuminating the relative advantage of chlorpromazine versus a placebo reaffirms its usefulness. As for the primaryprocess manual, even granted its early stage of development, it is a tool with wide possibilities. If it does nothing more than increase the clinician's sensitivity to the subtle changes taking place under the effect of drugs, this would be sufficient reason to continue working with it. If by finding operational definitions for the psychoanalytic concept of primary and secondary processes, one can understand changes in patients within the context of a meaningful theoretical system, the rewards for continuing to invest in the manual will be even more fruitful.
